Back To Knee Jerk Airline Security
In the wake of the attempted bombing on an international Detroit-bound Northwest Airlines flight on Christmas Day, it seems as though we’re back to the post 9/11 practice of knee jerk security that has no hope of making us more secure. Forcing people to remain seated for the last hour of flight; taking away personal items during the same time period; and shutting off in-flight tracking maps are all designed to present the illusion of increased security without actually providing it.
Terrorists can track the flight location with a pocket watch and the paper map you find in the back of the airline magazine if they know the flight mileage; they don’t need an electronic map to do it. Instead of trying to set off a bomb during the last hour before landing when they are restricted to their seats, they can pick any other time during the flight. We’ll all be just as dead if that happens. Taking away blankets, books and laptops during the same time period won’t make us safer–just crankier, wetter (for those children who can’t hold it for an hour), colder, more bored, and more prone to incidents of air rage in the absence of the few creature comforts left for anyone flying in the economy section these days.
So, what can be done to actually provide better airline security?
- Provide better training to those on the front lines–the screeners and supervisors who are responsible for making sure no one gets on a plane with a weapon or explosive. Airport screeners routinely fail to find hidden weapons or fake bombs during undercover tests run by the TSA. A CNN investigation last year revealed that airport screeners failed at rates as high as 75% at some airports.* Screeners have to get over their indifference and start screening passengers at checkpoints as if it their own lives are at stake instead of just those on the plane which they won’t be on.
- Better tools to help the screeners to do their jobs.High tech scanners designed to see through clothing to detect explosives have been available for years now, but have been delayed by those with privacy concerns who are squeamish about full body scans (they show the size and shape of the body in detail). However, advancement in technology are rendering many of these concerns moot.
Photo by H. Darr Beiser, USA TODAY
L-3 Communications Holdings is currently testing a new machine at Amsterdam’s Schipol’s airport in which computer software views the scan and identifies any body anomalies (such as something strapped to the back or leg) and flags the passenger for an in-person secondary screening.** Ironically, Abdulmutallab did not pass through that type of screening machine or any others currently being tested by Schipol when he changed planes–only the standard metal detector which could not detect the bomb making material strapped to his body. Any of the machines currently in testing at the Amsterdam Airport could have caught his bomb making material.
- Revocation of visas for foreign nationals on the “Watch” list, not just those on the “No Fly” list. Entry into the United States is a privilege not a right. If they are on a watch list, we clearly have concerns about them. Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab was allowed to keep a multiple-entry visa despite being placed on the “Watch” list and his father raising multiple red flags about his connection to terrorism.
- Better communication between government agencies. The State Department should have passed along the information about Abdulmutallab to the various intelligence agencies in a timely manner to prevent the incidence that occurred. This was one of the Achilles heels exposed after 9/11 and it clearly hasn’t been fixed. There is no excuse for this. Whoever is responsible for failing to share the information or investigate how much of a threat Abdulmutallab really was should be fired. No excuses; no second chances.
- Acceptance that flying and travel will always inherently present a certain amount of risk. Nothing the government can do will ever keep you completely safe. Giving up your civil liberities in a knee-jerk fear-driven reaction to terrorism isn’t going to keep you safer. Nor will taking away blankets, books or your iPod on a flight.
In short, we need real security, not window dressing security that has no hope of keeping us safe.
*http://www.cnn.com/2008/US/01/28/tsa.bombtest/index.html
**http://abclocal.go.com/wpvi/story?section=news/national_world&id=7191753
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This entry was posted on Tuesday, December 29th, 2009 at 11:22 AM. It is filed under Travel Industry Commentary and tagged with Abdulmutallab, airport body scanning machines, airport security, Amsterdam Schipol Airport, attempted bombing, Northwest Airlines, security failure, security illusion, State Department failure, terrorism, Travel, TSA, TSA screeners, US entry visas.
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Kim Day is a freelance photographer and travel writer located in the Philadelphia suburbs.
Back To Knee Jerk Airline Security
Terrorists can track the flight location with a pocket watch and the paper map you find in the back of the airline magazine if they know the flight mileage; they don’t need an electronic map to do it. Instead of trying to set off a bomb during the last hour before landing when they are restricted to their seats, they can pick any other time during the flight. We’ll all be just as dead if that happens. Taking away blankets, books and laptops during the same time period won’t make us safer–just crankier, wetter (for those children who can’t hold it for an hour), colder, more bored, and more prone to incidents of air rage in the absence of the few creature comforts left for anyone flying in the economy section these days.
So, what can be done to actually provide better airline security?
Photo by H. Darr Beiser, USA TODAY
L-3 Communications Holdings is currently testing a new machine at Amsterdam’s Schipol’s airport in which computer software views the scan and identifies any body anomalies (such as something strapped to the back or leg) and flags the passenger for an in-person secondary screening.** Ironically, Abdulmutallab did not pass through that type of screening machine or any others currently being tested by Schipol when he changed planes–only the standard metal detector which could not detect the bomb making material strapped to his body. Any of the machines currently in testing at the Amsterdam Airport could have caught his bomb making material.
In short, we need real security, not window dressing security that has no hope of keeping us safe.
*http://www.cnn.com/2008/US/01/28/tsa.bombtest/index.html
**http://abclocal.go.com/wpvi/story?section=news/national_world&id=7191753
No related posts.
This entry was posted on Tuesday, December 29th, 2009 at 11:22 AM. It is filed under Travel Industry Commentary and tagged with Abdulmutallab, airport body scanning machines, airport security, Amsterdam Schipol Airport, attempted bombing, Northwest Airlines, security failure, security illusion, State Department failure, terrorism, Travel, TSA, TSA screeners, US entry visas. You can follow any responses to this entry through the RSS 2.0 feed.